Mission House
Plaintiff, v.
Case No.:
COMES NOW the Defendant, John Arthur Doe (“John”), In Propria Persona, appearing specially not generally, Sui Juris and Sui Generis, and in support of his Petition For Order to Show Cause, states as follows:
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………..……2 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………....4 1. Pleading Special Matters (FRCP Rule 9(a)(2), (c) and (h)(1))……………….? 2. Introduction……………………………………………………………..? 3. Jurisdiction………………………………………………………………………… Challenging the Federal Legislative Jurisdiction………………. Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction………………………….. Franchisees as Federal Agents not State government………… 4. Conclusion
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES TOA \h \c "1" Cases A.L.A. SCHECTER POULTY CORP. v. UNITED STATES, 295 US 495, 554 (1935) 14 AIRLINE STEWARDS & STEWARDESSES ASSN. v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC., 267 F. 2d 170, 175 (8th Cir. 1959) 18 AMERICAN BANANA COMPANY v. UNITED FRUIT COMPANY, 213 US 347, 357, 29 S. Ct. 511 (1909) 17 AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. v. 356 BALES of COTTON, 1 Peter 511, 7L.Ed 242 (1828) 24 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) 7 Bauman v. United States, 156 F.2d 534(C.C.P. LA 1946) 8 BLACKMER v. UNITED STATES, 284 US 421, 437, 52 S. Ct. 252 (1932) 17 Bowen v. Johnson, 306 US 19, 59 S. Ct 442(1939) 12 BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON, 507 US 619, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993) 17 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 29 CAHA v. UNITED STATES, 152 US 211, 215, 14 S. Ct. 513 (1894) 17 CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SCHULTZ, 416 US 21, 26, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 Ed. 2d 812 (1974) 24 City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951) 20 City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1973) 21 CLEARY v. UNITED STATES, 728 F. 2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1984) 17 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) 22 COHENS v. VIRGINIA, 19 US 264, 6 Wheat, 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821) 16 COLEMAN v. THOMPSON, 501 US 722, 759 (1991)) 15 COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM. V. NAHAS, 738 F. 2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 18 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958) 21 Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958) 21 DOWLING v. UNITED STATES, 473 US 207, 213 (1985) 14 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991) 29 Engle v. Isaac, 456 US 107, 128, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982) 17 GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 US 1 (1824) 14 Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-37 (1962) 8 GRAVES v. SNEAD, 541 F. 2d 159, 161 (1976), cert. denied, 429 US 1093 (1976) 23 HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION Assoc., 452 US 264, 276-77, 310-13 (1981) 14 HUBBARD v. AMMERMAN, 465 F. 2d 1169, 1176 (1972), cert, denied, 410 US 910 (1972) 24 In re Arminio, 38 B.R. 472 (BANKRUPTCY CONN, 1984) 9 In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888) 21 INSURANCE CORPORATION OF IRELAND, LTD. V. COMPAGNIEDES DES BAUITIES DE GUINEE, 456 US 694, 72 L. Ed 2d 492 (1982) 19 INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN’S UNION v. JUNEAU SPRUCE CO., 342 US 237, 96 L. Ed 275 (1952) 24 LANDANO v. RAFFERTY, 670F. Supp. 570, 583 (1987) 26 Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999) 20 Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 939 29 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) 29 MARTIN v. HUNTER’S LESSEE, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) 14 McClesky v. ZANT, 499 US 467, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed 2d 517, at 567-68(1991) 26 meredith v. united states, 330 F.2d 9, 11(9th Cir. 1964) 17 MICKEEL V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 722 F. 2d 582, 589(9th Cir. 1983) 17 Mookini v. United States, 303 US 201, 82 L. Ed 748 (1938) 9 N.L.R.B. v. JONES LAUGLIN STEEL CO., 301 US 1, 37 (1937) 14 NEW YORK v. United states, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2412-19, 2431 (1992) 14 NORTH LARAMIE LAND CO. v. HOFFMAN et al., 268 US 276, 283, 69 L. Ed. (1925) 26 O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 US 516, 77 ED. 1356 (1933) 9 OWEN EQUIPMENT AND ERECTION COMPANY v. GERALDINE KROGER, 437 US 365, 57 L Ed 2d 274, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978) 9 Palmore v. United States, 411 US 389, 390-410, 36 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1973) 9 PEOPLE v. GODFREY, 17 John 225 at 233 12 PFEIFFER v. WILLIAM WRIGLEY JR. CO., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985) 18 POLISH NATIONAL ALLANCE v. N.L.R.B., 322 US 643, 650 (1944) 17 REYES v. SECRETARY OF H.E.W., 476 F. 2d 910, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 18 Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. Rptr. 408] 20 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 -545 (1987) 29 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) 22 SCHOENBAUM v. FIRSTBROOK, 268 F. SUPP. 385, 392 (S.P.N.Y. 1967) 18 SCREWS v. UNITED STATES, 325 US 91, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 162 ALR 1330 (1945) (plurality opinion) 17 see Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) 29 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 29 STOWE v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984) 17 Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668] 20 SWEETON v. BROWN, 27 F. 2d 3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994) 19 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) 29 THOMAS v. BROWN & ROOT Inc, 745 F. 2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984) 18 U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980) 22 U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983) 21 UNITED STATES v. BENSON, 495 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1974) 12 UNITED STATES v. BOWMAN, 260 US 94, 97-98, 43 S. Ct. 39 (1922) 17 United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) 8 UNITED STATES v. CHIANTESE, 546 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1977), modified en banc, 560 F.2d 1244 (1977), on remand, 582 F.2d 974 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S. Ct. 2030, 60 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1979) 13 United States v. Cortney, 973 F.2d 764, 766-67(9th Cir. 1992) 8 UNITED STATES v. COTRONI, 527 F. 2d 708, 711 (2nd Cir. 1974) 17 UNITED STATES v. FOX, 94 US 670 (1878) 14 UNITED STATES v. HUTCHINSON, D.C. PA., FED. CAS. No. 15, 432 (1848) 15 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON, 337 F. 2d 180, 192 (1964), affirmed, 383 US 169 (1965), cert. denied, 385 US 346 25 UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, 115 S. Ct.1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 57 CRL 2033, 2035-38 (1995) 14 United States v. Maner, 611 F.2d 107(1980) at 112 13 UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL, 553 F. 2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977) 18 United States v. Nikida, 8F.3d 665, 668-69(9th Cir. 1993) 8 UNITED STATES v. PLATENBURG, 657 F. 2d 797 (5th Cir. 1981) 13 United States v. Robertson, 698 F.2d 703, 704 N. 1(5th Cir. 1983) 8 United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (D.C. Cir. 1885) 8 UNITED STATES v. SHULTZ, 17 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1994) 12 UNITED STATES v. TOWNSEND, 474 F. 2d 209 (5th Cir. 1973) 19 UNITED STATES v. TREVINA, 720 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1993) 13 UNITED STATES v. TULLY, 140 F. 899 (C.C.D. Mont. 1905) 13 UNITED STATES v. WATSON, 80 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. VA 1948) 19 UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION v. I.C.C., 891 F. 2d 908 (1989) 20 United Transportation Union v. I.C.C., 891 F. 2d 908(1989) 12 ZAHOUREK v. ARTHUR YOUNG AND CO., 750 F. 2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1984) 18 TOA \h \c "3" Other Authorities § 451 of Title 18, UNITED STATES CODE 1940 ed 22 16 Am. Jur. 2d § 256 15 456 US, at 702 19 Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856 6 FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACT, did not establish nationwide prohibitions against murder and the like. See ACT OF APRIL 30, 1790, ch. 9, Stat. 112 16 Rule 48(a) or (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 26 The Washington Post; Article entitled “The new Dixie Manifesto” By Michael Hill and Thomas Flemming, October 29, 1995, Section C, page 3 28 Title 18 UNITED STATES CODE, Section 7 22 TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 4001 27 Title 28 UNITED STATES CODES 14 TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1746(1), FEDERAL RULES of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 54 (c) 27 TOA \h \c "7" Constitutional Provisions 10th Article of Amendment of the Constitution 9 9th Article of Amendment of the Constitution 9 Article I 25 Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 12 Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, of the Constitution for the united States of America 10, 22 Article III 9, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 Article IV 25 Constitution for the United States Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 9 Id, at note 6 at 2047 CRL 16 Ninth and Tenth Articles of Amendments 14 United States Constitution, Article I V, Section 3, clause 2 16 United States Constitution, Articles of Amendments, Nine and Ten 14 United States Constitution. Article VI, Clause II 26
INTRODUCTION John is informed and aware that the Prosecution has failed to establish the jurisdiction of this Court, without which this Court must dismiss this action and discharge all charges levied as against the Named Defendant. JURISDICTION The burden of establishing proof of this Court’s jurisdiction falls solely upon the Prosecution acting on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, may not be waived, and may be challenged at any time. There is a presumption against existence of federal jurisdiction; thus, party invoking federal court's jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1332(c); Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 12(h)(3), 28 U.S.C.A. Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a federal court by consent, inaction, or stipulation. 28 U.S.C.A. §1332. Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted." Latana v. Hopper, 102 F.2d 188; Chicago v. New York, 37 F.Supp. 150. If parties do not raise question of lack of jurisdiction, it is the duty of the federal court to determine the manner sua sponte. 28 U.S.C. §1332."
Jurisdiction and venue (“Locus”) are the limiting factors of a court’s presumption of authority under which it may act. Locus in Quo -The place where anything is alleged to have been done. 1 Salk 94, Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856 TA \l "Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856" \s "Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856" \c 3 Locus Criminis- The locality or place of a crime. Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856 TA \s "Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856" Locus contractus regit actum. The place of the contract governs the act. Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856 TA \s "Bouvier’s Maxims of Law, 1856" Operation of a court outside of its territorial jurisdiction defeats its power and authority and all such actions may be challenged and defeated by operation of law at any time. The Office of this Court, and its operation outside of the District of Columbia without express authorization of Congress, is hereby challenged and must be determined before this Court can assert its authority. ???? hereby incorporates by reference his Memorandum and Brief in Support of ??????Title 4, USC 72 etc. Actions taken without jurisdiction are outside of the judicial function established by the Constitution subjecting such government agents to personal liability for their individual acts. See Bivens v. Six Unnamed Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Former President Taft, the person most responsible for the introduction and ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, understood these concepts well when he made the following ruling as a U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice after leaving the office of President: “It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people who live in it.” Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) TA \l "Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)" \s "Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)" \c 1 TA \s "Balzac v. Porto Rico" The establishment of a criminal action must first involve an injured party, the factual basis of which must be founded on a concrete and particularized matter of fact, the second requirement is to establish the location of the crime that caused such injury. If a government wants to reach outside its territory and create PRIVATE law for those who have not consented to its jurisdiction by the inducement to choose a domicile on its territory, the ONLY method it has for doing this is to exercise its private right to contract. John specifically objects to any presumption that he is a “resident” of federal territory as the use of such word would imply or presume that he is “property” (res) “identified” (ident), to which John denies any evidence exists to prove that he is property, and surrenders and disclaims any interest in any property that he is presumed to hold or have custody of on behalf of another. See Notice of Surrender and Disclaimer, 26 U.S.C.§ 2518. CHALLENGING THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S LAWFUL POSSESSION OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE ‘LOCUS IN QUO’ Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived. Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). TA \l "Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-37 (1962)" \s "Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-37 (1962)" \c 1 TA \s "Glidden v. Zdanok" Lack of jurisdiction may be asserted at any time and will be considered on appeal regardless whether or not the issue was raised in the trial court. United States v. Nikida, 8F.3d 665, 668-69(9th Cir. 1993) TA \l "United States v. Nikida, 8F.3d 665, 668-69(9th Cir. 1993)" \s "United States v. Nikida, 8F.3d 665, 668-69(9th Cir. 1993)" \c 1 TA \s "United States v. Nikida" ). Jurisdictional claims are an exception to the rule that a guilty plea waives all claims of Constitutional violations. United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) TA \l "United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991)" \s "United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991)" \c 1 TA \s "United States v. Caperell" , and United States v. Robertson, 698 F.2d 703, 704 N. 1(5th Cir. 1983) TA \l "United States v. Robertson, 698 F.2d 703, 704 N. 1(5th Cir. 1983)" \s "United States v. Robertson, 698 F.2d 703, 704 N. 1(5th Cir. 1983)" \c 1 TA \s "United States v. Robertson" . Regardless, the issue of whether the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT had the power to bring charges still remains. United States v. Cortez, 973 F. 2d 764, 766-67(9th Cir. 1992) TA \l "United States v. Cortney, 973 F.2d 764, 766-67(9th Cir. 1992)" \s "United States v. Cortney, 973 F.2d 764, 766-67(9th Cir. 1992)" \c 1 TA \s "United States v. Cortney" . Additionally, whether this Court has the authority to act When a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT is without jurisdiction of the offense, the judgment of conviction of the court and/or the jury is void ab initio, on its face. Bauman v. United States, 156 F.2d 534 (1946) TA \l "Bauman v. United States, 156 F.2d 534(C.C.P. LA 1946)" \s "Bauman v. United States, 156 F.2d 534(C.C.P. LA 1946)" \c 1 TA \s "Bauman v. United States" . Wherefore the subject of jurisdiction in the court over the i subject matter or the place where the crime was committed can be raised in any stage of the criminal proceedings, including execution of sentence, it is never presumed, but must always be proved and it is never waived by the accused. United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (1885) TA \l "United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (D.C. Cir. 1885)" \s "United States v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (D.C. Cir. 1885)" \c 1 TA \s "United States v. Rogers" . The reason that the jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT must be proven when challenged, is that the Constitutional authority is merely the first hurdle that must be overcome in determining that a UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT has jurisdiction over a particular controversy. The jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS are/is limited, not only by the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress. OWEN EQUIPMENT & ERECTION COMPANY v. KROGER, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) TA \l "OWEN EQUIPMENT AND ERECTION COMPANY v. GERALDINE KROGER, 437 US 365, 57 L Ed 2d 274, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978)" \s "OWEN EQUIPMENT AND ERECTION COMPANY v. GERALDINE KROGER, 437 US 365, 57 L Ed 2d 274, 98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978)" \c 1 TA \s "OWEN EQUIPMENT AND ERECTION COMPANY v. GERALDINE KROGER" . See also Constitution for the United States Article IV TA \s "Article IV" , Section 3, Clause 2 TA \l "Constitution for the United States Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2" \s "Constitution for the United States Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2" \c 7 TA \s "Constitution for the United States Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2" , was for territorial courts”- O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 77 ED. 1356 (1933) TA \l "O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 US 516, 77 ED. 1356 (1933)" \s "O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 US 516, 77 ED. 1356 (1933)" \c 1 TA \s "O’Donoghue v. United States" ; Mookini v. United States, 303 US 201, 82 L. Ed 748 (1938 TA \l "Mookini v. United States, 303 US 201, 82 L. Ed 748 (1938)" \s "Mookini v. United States, 303 US 201, 82 L. Ed 748 (1938)" \c 1 TA \s "Mookini v. United States" ). In re Arminio, 38 B.R. 472 (BANKRUPTCY CONN, 1984) TA \l "In re Arminio, 38 B.R. 472 (BANKRUPTCY CONN, 1984)" \s "In re Arminio, 38 B.R. 472 (BANKRUPTCY CONN, 1984)" \c 1 TA \s "In re Arminio" , it was held that; “Principle of sovereign immunity is a Constitutional limitation on federal judicial power.” [Emphasis mine]. This illustrates that the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT is not the sovereign, else there would be no limitation. Clearly, the people are the ultimate Sovereign, (9th Article of Amendment of the Constitution TA \l "9th Article of Amendment of the Constitution" \s "9th Article of Amendment of the Constitution" \c 7 TA \s "9th Article of Amendment of the Constitution" ) and then the “State” (10th Article of Amendment of the Constitution TA \l "10th Article of Amendment of the Constitution" \s "10th Article of Amendment of the Constitution" \c 7 TA \s "10th Article of Amendment of the Constitution" ) and Then the American Republic of the several united States, (Union of 50 States), which then has Constitutional limitations upon its FEDERAL judicial power, because its only authority and power is a result of it being specifically delegated and enumerated,…IN THE Constitution, from the Union of Land States, who in turn, obtained it from, “We The People.” It was held that, while Congress may establish “legislative courts”, whose judges do not enjoy the guarantees of Article III TA \l "Article III" \s "Article III" \c 7 , “inherently judicial tasks”, must be performed by judges deriving their power under Article III. UNITED STATES v. Saunders, 641 F. 2d 659, 663-69 (9th Cir. 1981) and Palmore v. United States, 411 US 389, 390-410, 36 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1973) TA \l "Palmore v. United States, 411 US 389, 390-410, 36 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1973)" \s "Palmore v. United States, 411 US 389, 390-410, 36 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1973)" \c 1 TA \s "Palmore v. United States" The law provides that once the State or FEDERAL jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven to exist. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980) Thus, the burden is upon the GOVERNMENT to bring forth documented proof that it is lawfully possessed with legislative jurisdiction over the ‘locus in quo’, within the sovereign republic of Washington, or in the alternative prove that the alleged criminal acts or contracts committed were within its jurisdiction in the sovereign republic of Washington state. Such proof must include evidence that the “State” of Washington is not operating as a for profit franchise through private contract collecting income from the abuse of the people under the color of law and authority by masquerading as “public officials”. See the Organic Act of 1871. Furthermore, the GOVERNMENT must also prove it had legislative parameters set out in Article I TA \s "Article I" , Section 8, Clause 17, of the Constitution for the united States of America TA \l "Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, of the Constitution for the united States of America" \s "Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, of the Constitution for the united States of America" \c 7 TA \s "Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, of the Constitution for the united States of America" and as in Title 12, 18, 31 and 46 of UNITED STATES CODE, and define such parameters. In the absence of Federal legislative jurisdiction over the location where the alleged activity occurred, this court lacks jurisdiction. Where “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT” also lacks both jurisdiction and legislative authority in ALL the FEDERAL cases concerning the undersigned in the sovereign republic of Washington state by its use of statutes from titles 18, 26, 28 of the UNITED STATES CODE, as there is no definition of such in those Titles. The issue of legislative jurisdiction of the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT over the geographical area(s), in which the purportedly criminal activities of the undersigned are alleged to have occurred, must be unequivocally established before the court can proceed. John has offered proof that the United States Tax Court lacks jurisdiction over any claims made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessing or determining any tax liability for the tax years 1997 through 2007 and has attached and filed concurrently herewith mandatory judicial notice of US Tax Court Case Number 17454-12. This Court must take mandatory judicial notice of the admission by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that no tax determinations exist for the tax years 1997 through 2007, without which no claim of evasion may exist. This Court lacks jurisdiction over declaring whether John has a tax burden due and owing and may not make declaratory judgment related to tax related matters as admitted in Fogel v. United States, 2001 WL 306496 (S.D. Cal). This Court must look to the U.S. Tax Court decision in relation to whether such tax determinations exist, which based upon the records held in Case 17454-12, No such determination of liability exists as admitted by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. This Court may no longer operate under a legal presumption that John owes, and ipso facto has attempted to evade, a tax due and owing where his offer of proof destroys such presumption by the admission of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Additionally, The FACTS that this issue’s significance cannot be overstated is illustrated by the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S own publication, published by the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE in 1956-1957. Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, (“Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the states”), Part I & II, particularly at Part II, which stated unequivocally that the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT has no authority to restrict or compel the activities of the individuals in those areas which are outside the legislative and territorial jurisdiction thereof, and that the Federal courts are limited by and do not exceed the jurisdiction thereof, and that the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT itself, stating as follows: “The Constitution gives express recognition to but one means of federal acquisition of legislative jurisdiction- by State consent under Article I TA \s "Article I" , Section 8, Clause 17 TA \l "Article I, Section 8, Clause 17" \s "Article I, Section 8, Clause 17" \c 7 …” Justice McLean suggested that; ‘The Constitution provided the sole mode for transfer of jurisdiction, and that if this mode is not pursued, no transfer of jurisdiction can take place.’ Bowen v. Johnson, 306 US 19, 59 S. Ct 442(1939) TA \l "Bowen v. Johnson, 306 US 19, 59 S. Ct 442(1939)" \s "Bowen v. Johnson, 306 US 19, 59 S. Ct 442(1939)" \c 1 TA \s "Bowen v. Johnson" .” It scarcely needs to be said that unless there has been a transfer of jurisdiction, (a) pursuant to Clause 17 (as stated above) by a FEDERAL acquisition of land with the state consent (ceded), (b) or by cession from the state to the FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, or (c) unless the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT has reserved jurisdiction upon the admission of the state, the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT possesses NO legislative jurisdiction over any area within a state. Such jurisdiction being for the exercise by the state, subject to non-interference by the state with FEDERAL functions. [Emphasis mine]. The federal government cannot, by unilateral action on its part, acquire legislative jurisdiction over any areas within the exterior boundaries of a state. United Transportation Union v. I.C.C., 891 F. 2d 908(1989) TA \l "United Transportation Union v. I.C.C., 891 F. 2d 908(1989)" \s "United Transportation Union v. I.C.C., 891 F. 2d 908(1989)" \c 1 TA \s "United Transportation Union v. I.C.C." ] It is axiomatic that the prosecution must always prove territorial jurisdiction over a crime in order to sustain a conviction therefore. UNITED STATES v. BENSON, 495 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1974) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. BENSON, 495 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1974)" \s "UNITED STATES v. BENSON, 495 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1974)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. BENSON" . Chief Justice John Marshall observed, that to bring these offenses within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union, it must have been first committed out of the jurisdiction of any state. “it is not the offense committed, but the place in which it is committed, which must be out of the jurisdiction of the state.” PEOPLE v. GODFREY, 17 John 225 at 233 TA \l "PEOPLE v. GODFREY, 17 John 225 at 233" \s "PEOPLE v. GODFREY, 17 John 225 at 233" \c 1 TA \s "PEOPLE v. GODFREY" . In UNITED STATES v. SHULTZ, 17 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1994) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. SHULTZ, 17 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1994)" \s "UNITED STATES v. SHULTZ, 17 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1994)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. SHULTZ" , this court speaks firmly and unequivocally of the necessity for the GOVERNMENT to prove the jurisdiction element and that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised during any stage of the criminal proceedings including post verdict. The court held that: “This court has continually cautioned the government that its failure to adequately prove the jurisdiction element might one day require the reversal of bank fraud convictions.” [United States v. Maner, 611 F.2d 107(1980) at 112 TA \l "United States v. Maner, 611 F.2d 107(1980) at 112" \s "United States v. Maner, 611 F.2d 107(1980) at 112" \c 1 TA \s "United States v. Maner" .] That day came in UNITED STATES v. PLATENBURG, 657 F. 2d 797 (5th Cir. 1981) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. PLATENBURG, 657 F. 2d 797 (5th Cir. 1981)" \s "UNITED STATES v. PLATENBURG, 657 F. 2d 797 (5th Cir. 1981)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. PLATENBURG" ; UNITED STATES v. TREVINA, 720 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1993) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. TREVINA, 720 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1993)" \s "UNITED STATES v. TREVINA, 720 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1993)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. TREVINA" , and it has likewise come today. THE MANER COURT, (Et Supra) spoke again of the necessity of the GOVERNMENT to prove the jurisdiction issue. The court held that: “…lack of sufficient proof compels reversal and dismissal of indictment, not just remand for a new trial with better evidence.” The Fifth Circuit said in MANER, speaking of the necessity to prove jurisdiction; “…indeed, we have difficulty comprehending why the GOVERNMENT repeatedly fails to prove this element more carefully since the GOVERNMENTS burden is so simple and straightforward, as in the other cases we have discussed, the GOVERNMENT treads perilously close to reversal and may soon find itself crossing the line from sufficiency to insufficiency.” This court went on to say; “Although we often despair at repeatedly calling trail courts’ attention to the necessity of not repeating again and again an action we often hold to be in error.” [UNITED STATES v. CHIANTESE, 546 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1977), modified en banc, 560 F.2d 1244 (1977), on remand, 582 F.2d 974 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S. Ct. 2030, 60 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1979) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. CHIANTESE, 546 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1977), modified en banc, 560 F.2d 1244 (1977), on remand, 582 F.2d 974 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S. Ct. 2030, 60 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1979)" \s "UNITED STATES v. CHIANTESE, 546 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1977), modified en banc, 560 F.2d 1244 (1977), on remand, 582 F.2d 974 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S. Ct. 2030, 60 L. Ed. 2d 395 (1979)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. CHIANTESE" ,] “the fault lies not with the trial judge, it rests squarely on the shoulders of the prosecutor.” This is a classic “textbook example” of absence of territorial jurisdiction decided by honorable jurists of the past is in UNITED STATES v. TULLY, 140 F. 899 (C.C.D. Mont. 1905) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. TULLY, 140 F. 899 (C.C.D. Mont. 1905)" \s "UNITED STATES v. TULLY, 140 F. 899 (C.C.D. Mont. 1905)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. TULLY" . In TULLY TA \s "UNITED STATES v. TULLY" , supra, demonstrates the absence of territorial jurisdiction in a state or in the “UNITED STATES”. Whereas, territorial jurisdiction is a fundamental requirement, it is not the only jurisdictional requirement. Any time the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT seeks to prosecute, and thereby regulate activity lacking in the requisite FEDERAL jurisdiction, the control of which is Constitutionally within the domain of “state” and local authorities, the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT thereby violates BOTH the federal and state Constitution as the “states” are the repository of Our “Common Law” rights (see Title 28 UNITED STATES CODES TA \l "Title 28 UNITED STATES CODES" \s "Title 28 UNITED STATES CODES" \c 3 TA \s "Title 28 UNITED STATES CODES" ) as also is well discussed in GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 US 1 (1824) TA \l "GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 US 1 (1824)" \s "GIBBONS v. OGDEN, 22 US 1 (1824)" \c 1 TA \s "GIBBONS v. OGDEN" ; A.L.A. SCHECTER POULTY CORP. v. UNITED STATES, 295 US 495, 554 (1935) TA \l "A.L.A. SCHECTER POULTY CORP. v. UNITED STATES, 295 US 495, 554 (1935)" \s "A.L.A. SCHECTER POULTY CORP. v. UNITED STATES, 295 US 495, 554 (1935)" \c 1 TA \s "A.L.A. SCHECTER POULTY CORP. v. UNITED STATES" ; N.L.R.B. v. JONES LAUGLIN STEEL CO., 301 US 1, 37 (1937) TA \l "N.L.R.B. v. JONES LAUGLIN STEEL CO., 301 US 1, 37 (1937)" \s "N.L.R.B. v. JONES LAUGLIN STEEL CO., 301 US 1, 37 (1937)" \c 1 TA \s "N.L.R.B. v. JONES LAUGLIN STEEL CO." ; HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION Assoc., 452 US 264, 276-77, 310-13 (1981) TA \l "HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION Assoc., 452 US 264, 276-77, 310-13 (1981)" \s "HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION ASSOC., 452 US 264, 276-77, 310-13 (1981)" \c 1 TA \s "HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING AND RECLAMATION ASSOC." ; NEW YORK v. United states, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2412-19, 2431 (1992) TA \l "NEW YORK v. United states, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2412-19, 2431 (1992)" \s "NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2412-19, 2431 (1992)" \c 1 TA \s "NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES" ; UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, 115 S. Ct.1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 57 CRL 2033, 2035-38 (1995) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, 115 S. Ct.1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 57 CRL 2033, 2035-38 (1995)" \s "UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, 115 S. Ct.1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 57 CRL 2033, 2035-38 (1995)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ" . The statutes most FEDERAL defendants are charged with violating would “as applied”, clearly exceed the scope of Congress’ enumerated power, thereby upsetting the delicate federal balance embodied in the Ninth and Tenth Articles of Amendments TA \l "Ninth and Tenth Articles of Amendments" \s "Ninth and Tenth Articles of Amendments" \c 7 of the Constitution for the united States of America, and its Commerce Clause, and the various “state” Constitutions as well. The FEDERAL GOVERNMENT is one of delegated and enumerated powers, (see MARTIN v. HUNTER’S LESSEE, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816) TA \l "MARTIN v. HUNTER’S LESSEE, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816)" \s "MARTIN v. HUNTER’S LESSEE, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304 (1816)" \c 1 TA \s "MARTIN v. HUNTER’S LESSEE" . All other powers have been retained by the states, or the people. (see United States Constitution, Articles of Amendments, Nine and Ten TA \l "United States Constitution, Articles of Amendments, Nine and Ten" \s "United States Constitution, Articles of Amendments, Nine and Ten" \c 7 TA \s "United States Constitution, Articles of Amendments, Nine and Ten" ). In the area of criminal law, FEDERAL crimes are solely the creatures of statute. (see DOWLING v. UNITED STATES, 473 US 207, 213 (1985) TA \l "DOWLING v. UNITED STATES, 473 US 207, 213 (1985)" \s "DOWLING v. UNITED STATES, 473 US 207, 213 (1985)" \c 1 TA \s "DOWLING v. UNITED STATES" . However, Congress’ power to declare an act of crime ultimately must be grounded in some provision of the Constitution. (see UNITED STATES v. FOX, 94 US 670 (1878) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. FOX, 94 US 670 (1878)" \s "UNITED STATES v. FOX, 94 US 670 (1878)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. FOX" . There are clearly “jurisdictional pre-requisites” for legislation by Congress, (see COLEMAN v. THOMPSON, 501 US 722, 759 (1991)) TA \l "COLEMAN v. THOMPSON, 501 US 722, 759 (1991))" \s "COLEMAN v. THOMPSON, 501 US 722, 759 (1991))" \c 1 TA \s "COLEMAN v. THOMPSON, 501 US 722, 759 (1991))" , which, when violated leave the statute ‘void ab initio’, as is well stated in 16 Am. Jur. 2d § 256 TA \l "16 Am. Jur. 2d § 256" \s "16 Am. Jur. 2d § 256" \c 3 TA \s "16 Am. Jur. 2d § 256" . “The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, whether FEDERAL or state, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void an ineffective for any purpose, since the unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the dates of the decision so branding it an unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it would be, had the statute not been enacted. No repeal of such an enactment is necessary, since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it. “… No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it”.
The law is well established that a Sovereign, Natural Born Citizen of a “State”, standing and existing upon Private Property, (The Soil of the Land), on “Common Law” issues, would leave the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, and all of its frachisees, agencies and instrumentalities in want of jurisdiction, without any Personal Jurisdiction. “The jurisdiction of offenses which are cognizable at common law resides in the state(peoples) courts alone, even though the general government may be the party aggrieved by the misdeed complained of.” [UNITED STATES v. HUTCHINSON, D.C. PA., FED. CAS. No. 15, 432 (1848) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. HUTCHINSON, D.C. PA., FED. CAS. No. 15, 432 (1848)" \s "UNITED STATES v. HUTCHINSON, D.C. PA., FED. CAS. No. 15, 432 (1848)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. HUTCHINSON" ] In UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ TA \s "UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ" , 115 S.Ct 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626, 57 CRL 2033 (1995). The United States Supreme Court, well addressed the issue of exclusive legislative jurisdiction of Congress, and its effect on the powers of the FEDERAL UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, with the subsequent limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction, of a FEDERAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, which was an eloquent restatement of Our unchanged law. Justice Thomas, in a concurring majority opinion stated: “Indeed, on this crucial point, the majority and Justice Breyer(the Justice writing the dissent opinion) agree in principle, the federal government has nothing approaching a police power.” Id, at 2043 CRL. Even before GIBBONS TA \s "GIBBONS v. OGDEN" , Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in COHENS v. VIRGINIA, 19 US 264, 6 Wheat, 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821) TA \l "COHENS v. VIRGINIA, 19 US 264, 6 Wheat, 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821)" \s "COHENS v. VIRGINIA, 19 US 264, 6 Wheat, 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821)" \c 1 TA \s "COHENS v. VIRGINIA" , noted that Congress had no general right to punish murder committed within any of the states. Id at 426. It was clear that Congress cannot punish felonies generally, Id at 428. The Courts’ only qualification was that Congress could enact such laws for places where it enjoyed plenary powers – for instance, over the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Id at 426. “Thus, whatever effect ordinary murders or robbery, or gun possession might have on interstate commerce (or on any other subject of FEDERAL concern) was irrelevant to the question of Congressional power.” Id at 2047 CRL. It is worth noting that Congress, in the first FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACT, did not establish nationwide prohibitions against murder and the like. See ACT OF APRIL 30, 1790, ch. 9, Stat. 112 TA \l "FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACT, did not establish nationwide prohibitions against murder and the like. See ACT OF APRIL 30, 1790, ch. 9, Stat. 112" \s "FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACT, did not establish nationwide prohibitions against murder and the like. See ACT OF APRIL 30, 1790, ch. 9, Stat. 112" \c 3 TA \s "FEDERAL CRIMINAL ACT, did not establish nationwide prohibitions against murder and the like. See ACT OF APRIL 30, 1790, ch. 9, Stat. 112" . To be sure, congress outlawed murder, manslaughter, maiming, and larceny, but only where those acts were either committed on UNITED STATES territory, not part of a state, or on high seas. I BID. See United States Constitution, Article I TA \s "Article I" V, Section 3, clause 2 TA \l "United States Constitution, Article I V, Section 3, clause 2" \s "United States Constitution, Article I V, Section 3, clause 2" \c 7 TA \s "United States Constitution, Article I V, Section 3, clause 2" , (plenary authority over UNITED STATES territory and property) Notwithstanding any substantial effects that murder, kidnapping or gun possession might have had on interstate commerce, Congress understood that it could not establish nationwide prohibitions. Likewise, there were no laws in the early Congresses that regulated manufacturing and/or agriculture. Nor was there any statute which purported to regulate activities with “substantial effects” on interstate commerce. (Emphasis added, was emphasized in the original text), Id, at note 6 at 2047 CRL TA \l "Id, at note 6 at 2047 CRL" \s "Id, at note 6 at 2047 CRL" \c 7 . Under Our FEDERAL system, the; “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.” [BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON, 507 US 619, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993) TA \l "BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON, 507 US 619, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993)" \s "BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON, 507 US 619, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993)" \c 1 TA \s "BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON" (quoting) Engle v. Isaac, 456 US 107, 128, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982) TA \l "Engle v. Isaac, 456 US 107, 128, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982)" \s "Engle v. Isaac, 456 US 107, 128, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982)" \c 1 TA \s "Engle v. Isaac" ; see also SCREWS v. UNITED STATES, 325 US 91, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 162 ALR 1330 (1945) (plurality opinion) TA \l "SCREWS v. UNITED STATES, 325 US 91, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 162 ALR 1330 (1945) (plurality opinion)" \s "SCREWS v. UNITED STATES, 325 US 91, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 162 ALR 1330 (1945) (plurality opinion)" \c 1 TA \s "SCREWS v. UNITED STATES" ]
The law is well established regarding legislative, as follows: “…all federal crimes are statutory, and all criminal prosecutions in the federal courts are based on acts of Congress, …” Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26. Taking of Testimony, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Paragraph 2. “This court has a duty to recognize when Congress has exceeded limits allowable in reason for the judgment which it has exercised.” [POLISH NATIONAL ALLANCE v. N.L.R.B., 322 US 643, 650 (1944) TA \l "POLISH NATIONAL ALLANCE v. N.L.R.B., 322 US 643, 650 (1944)" \s "POLISH NATIONAL ALLANCE v. N.L.R.B., 322 US 643, 650 (1944)" \c 1 TA \s "POLISH NATIONAL ALLANCE v. N.L.R.B." ] It is a well established principle of law, that; “all federal legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES unless a contrary intent appears”. [CAHA v. UNITED STATES, 152 US 211, 215, 14 S. Ct. 513 (1894) TA \l "CAHA v. UNITED STATES, 152 US 211, 215, 14 S. Ct. 513 (1894)" \s "CAHA v. UNITED STATES, 152 US 211, 215, 14 S. Ct. 513 (1894)" \c 1 TA \s "CAHA v. UNITED STATES" ; AMERICAN BANANA COMPANY v. UNITED FRUIT COMPANY, 213 US 347, 357, 29 S. Ct. 511 (1909) TA \l "AMERICAN BANANA COMPANY v. UNITED FRUIT COMPANY, 213 US 347, 357, 29 S. Ct. 511 (1909)" \s "AMERICAN BANANA COMPANY v. UNITED FRUIT COMPANY, 213 US 347, 357, 29 S. Ct. 511 (1909)" \c 1 TA \s "AMERICAN BANANA COMPANY v. UNITED FRUIT COMPANY" ; UNITED STATES v. BOWMAN, 260 US 94, 97-98, 43 S. Ct. 39 (1922) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. BOWMAN, 260 US 94, 97-98, 43 S. Ct. 39 (1922)" \s "UNITED STATES v. BOWMAN, 260 US 94, 97-98, 43 S. Ct. 39 (1922)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. BOWMAN" ; BLACKMER v. UNITED STATES, 284 US 421, 437, 52 S. Ct. 252 (1932) TA \l "BLACKMER v. UNITED STATES, 284 US 421, 437, 52 S. Ct. 252 (1932)" \s "BLACKMER v. UNITED STATES, 284 US 421, 437, 52 S. Ct. 252 (1932)" \c 1 TA \s "BLACKMER v. UNITED STATES" ] The above priniciple of law is expressed in a number of cases from the federal appellate courts. See MICKEEL V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 722 F. 2d 582, 589(9th Cir. 1983) TA \l "MICKEEL V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 722 F. 2d 582, 589(9th Cir. 1983)" \s "MICKEEL V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 722 F. 2d 582, 589(9th Cir. 1983)" \c 1 TA \s "MICKEEL V. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN" , holding the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as territorial; meredith v. united states, 330 F.2d 9, 11(9th Cir. 1964) TA \l "meredith v. united states, 330 F.2d 9, 11(9th Cir. 1964)" \s "MEREDITH V. UNITED STATES, 330 F.2d 9, 11(9th Cir. 1964)" \c 1 TA \s "MEREDITH V. UNITED STATES" , holding the FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT as territorial; UNITED STATES v. COTRONI, 527 F. 2d 708, 711 (2nd Cir. 1974) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. COTRONI, 527 F. 2d 708, 711 (2nd Cir. 1974)" \s "UNITED STATES v. COTRONI, 527 F. 2d 708, 711 (2nd Cir. 1974)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. COTRONI" , holding FEDERAL wiretap laws as territorial; STOWE v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984) TA \l "STOWE v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984)" \s "STOWE v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984)" \c 1 TA \s "STOWE v. Devoy" , holding the same as CLEARY v. UNITED STATES, 728 F. 2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1984) TA \l "CLEARY v. UNITED STATES, 728 F. 2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1984)" \s "CLEARY v. UNITED STATES, 728 F. 2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1984)" \c 1 TA \s "CLEARY v. UNITED STATES" , holding FEDERAL age discrimination laws as territorial; THOMAS v. BROWN & ROOT Inc, 745 F. 2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984) TA \l "THOMAS v. BROWN & ROOT Inc, 745 F. 2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984)" \s "THOMAS v. BROWN & ROOT Inc, 745 F. 2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984)" \c 1 TA \s "THOMAS v. BROWN & ROOT Inc" , holding the same a CLEARY, supra; UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL, 553 F. 2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL, 553 F. 2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977)" \s "UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL, 553 F. 2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1977)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL" , holding that MARINE MAMMALS PROTECTION ACT as territorial; PFEIFFER v. WILLIAM WRIGLEY JR. CO., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985) TA \l "PFEIFFER v. WILLIAM WRIGLEY JR. CO., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985)" \s "PFEIFFER v. WILLIAM WRIGLEY JR. CO., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985)" \c 1 TA \s "PFEIFFER v. WILLIAM WRIGLEY JR. CO." , and ZAHOUREK v. ARTHUR YOUNG AND CO., 750 F. 2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1984) TA \l "ZAHOUREK v. ARTHUR YOUNG AND CO., 750 F. 2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1984)" \s "ZAHOUREK v. ARTHUR YOUNG AND CO., 750 F. 2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1984)" \c 1 TA \s "ZAHOUREK v. ARTHUR YOUNG AND CO." , holding that age discrimination laws as territorial; AIRLINE STEWARDS & STEWARDESSES ASSN. v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC., 267 F. 2d 170, 175 (8th Cir. 1959) TA \l "AIRLINE STEWARDS & STEWARDESSES ASSN. v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC., 267 F. 2d 170, 175 (8th Cir. 1959)" \s "AIRLINE STEWARDS & STEWARDESSES ASSN. v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC., 267 F. 2d 170, 175 (8th Cir. 1959)" \c 1 TA \s "AIRLINE STEWARDS & STEWARDESSES ASSN. v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES INC." , held that RAILWAY LABOR ACT as territorial; COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM. V. NAHAS, 738 F. 2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1984) TA \l "COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM. V. NAHAS, 738 F. 2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1984)" \s "COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM. V. NAHAS, 738 F. 2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1984)" \c 1 TA \s "COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM. V. NAHAS" , holding that commissions subpoena power under FEDERAL law as territorial; REYES v. SECRETARY OF H.E.W., 476 F. 2d 910, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1984) TA \l "REYES v. SECRETARY OF H.E.W., 476 F. 2d 910, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1984)" \s "REYES v. SECRETARY OF H.E.W., 476 F. 2d 910, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1984)" \c 1 TA \s "REYES v. SECRETARY OF H.E.W." , holding that ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACT as territorial; SCHOENBAUM v. FIRSTBROOK, 268 F. SUPP. 385, 392 (S.P.N.Y. 1967) TA \l "SCHOENBAUM v. FIRSTBROOK, 268 F. SUPP. 385, 392 (S.P.N.Y. 1967)" \s "SCHOENBAUM v. FIRSTBROOK, 268 F. SUPP. 385, 392 (S.P.N.Y. 1967)" \c 1 TA \s "SCHOENBAUM v. FIRSTBROOK" , holding that the SECURITIES ACT as territorial. The issue was perhaps best stated in CAHA v. UNITED STATES TA \s "CAHA v. UNITED STATES" , supra, where the Supreme Court stated as follows: “The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government”. 152 US At 215. The “UNITED STATES”, has territorial jurisdiction only in WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, the FEDERAL enclaves within the states, and in the TERRITORIES and INSULAR POSSESSIONS of the “UNITED STATES”, wherein the “UNITED STATES” as exclusive jurisdiction and this fundamental proposition of law is fully supported by literally hundreds of cases. In BOWEN V. JOHNSON, 97 F. 2d 860(9th Cir. 1938) TA \s "Bowen v. Johnson" , the question presented was whether jurisdiction over offense prosecuted in FEDERAL court could be raised in a petition for habeas corpus. The denial of BOWEN’s petition was reversed in BOWEN v JOHNSON, 306 US 19, 59 S. Ct. 442 (1939) TA \s "Bowen v. Johnson" , the Court concluding that such a jurisdictional challenge could be raised in a habeas corpus petition. There can be no “lawful” prosecution of a criminal charge in the FEDERAL courts absent “FEDERAL JURISDICTION”. See UNITED STATES v. WATSON, 80 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. VA 1948) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. WATSON, 80 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. VA 1948)" \s "UNITED STATES v. WATSON, 80 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. VA 1948)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. WATSON" , wherein FEDERAL criminal charges were dismissed, the court stating as follows: “Without proof of the requisite ownership of, or possession of the United States, the crime has not been made out”. Id. At 651. In the UNITED STATES v. TOWNSEND, 474 F. 2d 209 (5th Cir. 1973) TA \l "UNITED STATES v. TOWNSEND, 474 F. 2d 209 (5th Cir. 1973)" \s "UNITED STATES v. TOWNSEND, 474 F. 2d 209 (5th Cir. 1973)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. TOWNSEND" , a conviction for receiving stolen property was reversed, when the court reviewed the record and learned that there was absolutely no evidence disclosing that the defendant had committed this offense within the jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES. In SWEETON v. BROWN, 27 F. 2d 3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994) TA \l "SWEETON v. BROWN, 27 F. 2d 3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994)" \s "SWEETON v. BROWN, 27 F. 2d 3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994)" \c 1 TA \s "SWEETON v. BROWN" , the court quoted: “Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived and jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a federal court by consent, inaction or stipulation… A court lacking jurisidiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking”. Id, at 1169. The issue was well addressed not so long ago by the United States Supreme Court in INSURANCE CORPORATION OF IRELAND, LTD. V. COMPAGNIEDES DES BAUITIES DE GUINEE, 456 US 694, 72 L. Ed 2d 492 (1982) TA \l "INSURANCE CORPORATION OF IRELAND, LTD. V. COMPAGNIEDES DES BAUITIES DE GUINEE, 456 US 694, 72 L. Ed 2d 492 (1982)" \s "INSURANCE CORPORATION OF IRELAND, LTD. V. COMPAGNIEDES DES BAUITIES DE GUINEE, 456 US 694, 72 L. Ed 2d 492 (1982)" \c 1 TA \s "INSURANCE CORPORATION OF IRELAND, LTD. V. COMPAGNIEDES DES BAUITIES DE GUINEE" , wherein the court stated: “Subject matter jurisdiction… is an Article III, TA \s "Article III" as well as a statutory requirement; it functions as a restriction on federal power and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign. Certain legal consequences directly follow from this. For example, no action of the parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant, principals of estopple do not apply and a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings…” “The rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States is inflexible and without exception, deny its jurisdiction and in the exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases when such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record.” 456 US, at 702 TA \l "456 US, at 702" \s "456 US, at 702" \c 3 . In UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION v. I.C.C., 891 F. 2d 908 (1989) TA \l "UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION v. I.C.C., 891 F. 2d 908 (1989)" \s "UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION v. I.C.C., 891 F. 2d 908 (1989)" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION v. I.C.C." , this court held, in concurring with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg.; “While Congress indisputably may preclude federal courts from hearing cases that they would be constitutionally permitted to hear, Congress cannot expand constitutional jurisdiction of federal courts, in essence, amend the Constitution-merely by legislating: federal courts must resist expansion of their own constitutional boundaries and reject any congressional orders or suggestions that would take them beyond the strictness of Article III TA \s "Article III" . [UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED, United States Constitution, Article III TA \s "Article III" , Section 1, et seq.] VOID JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS The operation of any “Judicial” action without legislative or territorial jurisdiction stands with no force or effect and may not be binding upon one of the people. The overwhelming position is that orders rendered by a court with no jurisdiction are not merely voidable but VOID having no force or effect. “A judgment is void on its face if the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting relief that it had no power to grant. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a trial court by the consent of the parties.” [(Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668] TA \l "Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668]" \s "Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 295, 298 [1 Cal. Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668]" \c 1 TA \s "Summers v. Superior Court" ; Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. Rptr. 408] TA \l "Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. Rptr. 408]" \s "Roberts v. Roberts (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 93, 101 [50 Cal. Rptr. 408]" \c 1 TA \s "Roberts v. Roberts" .) A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court. [Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999) TA \l "Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999)" \s "Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999)" \c 1 TA \s "Long v. Shorebank Development Corp." ]
A judgment shown by evidence to be invalid for want of jurisdiction is a void judgment or at all events has all attributes of a void judgment [City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951) TA \l "City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951)" \s "City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951)" \c 1 TA \s "City of Los Angeles v. Morgan" ] A void judgment is a simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects only, in the court rendering it and defect of jurisdiction may relate to a party or parties, the subject matter, the cause of action, the question to be determined, or relief to be granted. [Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958) TA \l "Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958)" \s "Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958)" \c 1 TA \s "Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver" ] Void judgment under federal law is one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over dispute or jurisdiction over parties, or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted unconstitutionally in entering judgment. [U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983) TA \l "U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983)" \s "U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383 (Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983)" \c 1 TA \s "U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co." ] Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need not be attacked directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed. [City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1973) TA \l "City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1973)" \s "City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1973)" \c 1 TA \s "City of Lufkin v. McVicker" ] ACTING WITHOUT JURISDICTION There exists for all Federal and State “actors”, officials, contractors, employees, franchisees, agents or others operating under COLOR of law and authority severe penalties. To operate outside of the Constitutional constraints and territory clearly prohibited. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it." [Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958) TA \l "Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958)" \s "Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958)" \c 1 TA \s "Cooper v. Aaron" ]. Such will render any action in violation of their oath of office without force and effect. If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888) TA \l "In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888)" \s "In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888)" \c 1 TA \s "In re Sawyer" , he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason. [Emphasis mine] Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980) TA \l "U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980)" \s "U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980)" \c 1 TA \s "U.S. v. Will" ; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) TA \l "Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)" \s "Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)" \c 1 TA \s "Cohens v. Virginia"
It is clear that the absence of legislative, territorial, subject matter and personal jurisdiction is the most severe offense and subject to punishment for TREASON. The liability of an agent of the United States is additionally clear when in violation of the protected rights of the people. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) TA \l "Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)" \s "Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974)" \c 1 TA \s "Scheuer v. Rhodes" stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original].
AMERICAN LAW Historical notes of Title 18 UNITED STATES CODE, Section 2111, state to wit: “Words” within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States were added to restrict the place of the offense to those places described in § 451 of Title 18, UNITED STATES CODE 1940 ed TA \l "§ 451 of Title 18, UNITED STATES CODE 1940 ed" \s "§ 451 of Title 18, UNITED STATES CODE 1940 ed" \c 3 TA \s "§ 451 of Title 18, UNITED STATES CODE 1940 ed" . Now section 7 of this title.” Title 18 UNITED STATES CODE, Section 7 TA \l "Title 18 UNITED STATES CODE, Section 7" \s "Title 18 UNITED STATES CODE, Section 7" \c 3 TA \s "Title 18 UNITED STATES CODE, Section 7" , is quoted as: special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States defined ‘sets out quite clearly what Congress intended the federal government to have “exclusive” and “original” jurisdiction over’. Subsection 7(1) says in part: “out of the jurisdiction of any particular state” Subsection 7(3), goes back to Article I TA \s "Article I" , Section 8, Clause 17, of the Constitution for the united States of America TA \s "Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, of the Constitution for the united States of America" . The historical note of Title 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 7, state to wit: In several revised sections of said Chapter II, the words ‘within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States’ have been added. Thus the jurisdictional limitation will be preserved in all sections of Chapter II describing an offense.” (note; As TITLE 18 U.S.C. was never published in the Federal Register, it is not a general law for the American Citizen, but only evidence of law, i.e. statute, for FEDERAL employees, agents and the like, to obey and abide by.) It was held that while Congress may establish “legislative courts”, whose judges do not enjoy guarantees of Article III TA \s "Article III" , “inherently judicial tasks” must be performed by judges deriving their power under Article I TA \s "Article I" . See UNITED STATES v. SANDERS, 641 F. 2d 659, 663-64 (9th Cir, 1981) cert. denied, 452 US 918, 69 L. Ed. 422 (1982) TA \s "UNITED STATES v. Sanders" and PALMORE v. UNITED STATES, 411 US 389, 390-410, 36 L. Ed 2d 342 (1973) TA \s "Palmore v. United States" . The “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS” creation and composition was by Act of Congress on June 25, 1948, [62 STAT. 895] (note: Congress was not in session on that date) and November 13, 1963 [77 STAT. 331], currently codified at Title 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 132 and SECTION 81-131. The Act of June 25, 1948, consolidated Title 28 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1, (1940 Edition), with Title 48 UNITED STATES, SECTION 641, (1940 Edition), which deals with the “DISTRICT COURTS”, of the territories and insular possessions of the “United States”. The “UNITED STATES DISTRIT COURTS” are not courts of general jurisdiction and have no jurisdiction, except as prescribed by Congress, pursuant to Article III TA \s "Article III" , of the Constitution for the united States of America, as held in GRAVES v. SNEAD, 541 F. 2d 159, 161 (1976), cert. denied, 429 US 1093 (1976) TA \l "GRAVES v. SNEAD, 541 F. 2d 159, 161 (1976), cert. denied, 429 US 1093 (1976)" \s "GRAVES v. SNEAD, 541 F. 2d 159, 161 (1976), cert. denied, 429 US 1093 (1976)" \c 1 TA \s "GRAVES v. SNEAD" . The jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS is codified at Title 28 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTIONS 1331, 1332, and 1333, which lists Civil, Admiralty, Maritime, Patent, Bankruptcy, Etc…., But Not Criminal. Title 18 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 3231, is a statute which contains a dual jurisdiction provisions, while it grants criminal jurisdiction to a “district court of the United States”, it does not grant the same criminal jurisdiction to a “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT”. Title 44 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1505 (A) reads thus: “That when regulations are not published in the Federal Register, application of any given statute is exclusively to agencies of the United States and officers, agents and employees of the United States.” The necessity for implementing regulations being published in the Federal Register is without question. See CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SCHULTZ, 416 US 21, 26, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 Ed. 2d 812 (1974) TA \l "CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SCHULTZ, 416 US 21, 26, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 Ed. 2d 812 (1974)" \s "CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SCHULTZ, 416 US 21, 26, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1500, 39 Ed. 2d 812 (1974)" \c 1 TA \s "CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSN. v. SCHULTZ" . The Acts of Congress, which established the “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS” do not vest these courts with any criminal jurisdiction and it is well established that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS have only such jurisdiction as is conferred by an Act of Congress under the Constitution for the united States of America. See HUBBARD v. AMMERMAN, 465 F. 2d 1169, 1176 (1972), cert, denied, 410 US 910 (1972) TA \l "HUBBARD v. AMMERMAN, 465 F. 2d 1169, 1176 (1972), cert, denied, 410 US 910 (1972)" \s "HUBBARD v. AMMERMAN, 465 F. 2d 1169, 1176 (1972), cert, denied, 410 US 910 (1972)" \c 1 TA \s "HUBBARD v. AMMERMAN" . Clearly, there is a distinct and definite difference between a “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT” and a “district court of the United States”. The aforementioned fact is well established by numerous decisions including INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN’S UNION v. JUNEAU SPRUCE CO., 342 US 237, 96 L. Ed 275 (1952) TA \l "INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN’S UNION v. JUNEAU SPRUCE CO., 342 US 237, 96 L. Ed 275 (1952)" \s "INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN’S UNION v. JUNEAU SPRUCE CO., 342 US 237, 96 L. Ed 275 (1952)" \c 1 TA \s "INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMAN’S UNION v. JUNEAU SPRUCE CO." , wherein the court stated: “The words ‘district court of the United States of America’ commonly describe Constitutional Courts created under this Article III TA \s "Article III" and not the legislative courts of the territories.” This issue is not a new issue, being well settled long ago, as in AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. v. 356 BALES of COTTON, 1 Peter 511, 7L.Ed 242 (1828) TA \l "AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. v. 356 BALES of COTTON, 1 Peter 511, 7L.Ed 242 (1828)" \s "AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. v. 356 BALES of COTTON, 1 Peter 511, 7L.Ed 242 (1828)" \c 1 TA \s "AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. v. 356 BALES of COTTON" , wherein: “Territorial courts are as legislative courts distinguished from Constitutional Courts” And also in BALZAC v. PORTO RICO, 258 US 298, 66 L. Ed. 627(1922) TA \s "Balzac v. Porto Rico" , wherein it was stated by the United States Supreme Court: “…the United States District Court is not a true United States Court established under Article III TA \s "Article III" to administer the raw Judicial Power of the United States therein conveyed, it is created by virtue of the sovereign Congressional faculty, granted under Article IV TA \s "Article IV" , Section III, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respective of territory belonging to the United States.” The distinction between the dual nature of the FEDERAL COURT System is also noted in Title 18 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 3241 which states that the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE CANAL ZONE shall have jurisdiction concurrently with the district courts of the United States, of offenses against the laws of the United States committed upon the high seas and this distinction is why venue and FEDERAL jurisdiction is more than a technical concept it is a Constitutional requirement, as stated in UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON, 337 F. 2d 180, 192 (1964), affirmed, 383 US 169 (1965), cert. denied, 385 US 346 TA \l "UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON, 337 F. 2d 180, 192 (1964), affirmed, 383 US 169 (1965), cert. denied, 385 US 346" \s "UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON, 337 F. 2d 180, 192 (1964), affirmed, 383 US 169 (1965), cert. denied, 385 US 346" \c 1 TA \s "UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON" . The foundational reason for the necessity of the differences was also discussed: “Those who wrote Our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special legislative acts which take away the life, liberty or property of particular named persons because the legislature thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment. They intended to safeguard the people of this country from punishment Without trial by duly constituted courts.” (Emphasis added), [GLIDDEN, supra at 716 TA \s "Glidden v. Zdanok" ] Clearly the vast majority of the members of the American Bar(British Accreditation Regency) Association have no problem with “us” being tried by a court that is not “duly constituted”, however the United States Supreme Court Justice Douglas, stated in GLIDDEN, supra at 719 TA \s "Glidden v. Zdanok" ; “that judges who might be confirmed for other courts, might never pass muster for the onerous and life-or-death duties of the Article III TA \s "Article III" judges.” The standard procedure today is for a State Citizen, without FEDERAL liablility, is to be subjected to FEDERAL “so called” indictment, a “so called” trial, before an Article I TA \l "Article I" \s "Article I" \c 7 TA \s "Article I" or Article IV TA \l "Article IV" \s "Article IV" \c 7 TA \s "Article IV" court, without criminal jurisdiction, without territorial jurisdiction, without personal jurisdiction, without subject matter jurisdiction, on issues without legislative jurisdiction, in absence(without) of judicial jurisdiction, and ALL in violation of the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the Sovereign, Republic State, wherein the Citizen resides!!! The United States Supreme Court has held that: “It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals.” [GLIDDEN, supra TA \s "Glidden v. Zdanok" , at 689] United States Supreme Court Justice Marshall well stated in McClesky v. ZANT, 499 US 467, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed 2d 517, at 567-68(1991) TA \l "McClesky v. ZANT, 499 US 467, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed 2d 517, at 567-68(1991)" \s "McClesky v. ZANT, 499 US 467, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed 2d 517, at 567-68(1991)" \c 1 TA \s "McClesky v. ZANT" , that: “Obviously, respect for the rule of law must start with those who are responsible for pronouncing the Law.” (Emphasis in original). The majority’s invocation of the “orderly administration of justice, ….” Rings hollow when the majority itself tosses aside established precedents…, disregards the will of Congress, fashions rules that defy the reasonable expectations of the persons who must conform their conduct to the laws’ dictates and applies those rules in a way that rewards STATE misconduct and deceit. Whatever, “abuse of the Writ” todays decision is designed to avert, pales in comparison with the majority’s own abuse of the norms that informs the proper judicial function. Courts are sworn to abide by the dictates of existing law and may not deliberately bypass explicit Congressional intent. See LANDANO v. RAFFERTY, 670F. Supp. 570, 583 (1987) TA \l "LANDANO v. RAFFERTY, 670F. Supp. 570, 583 (1987)" \s "LANDANO v. RAFFERTY, 670F. Supp. 570, 583 (1987)" \c 1 TA \s "LANDANO v. RAFFERTY" , and the United States Constitution. Article VI, Clause II TA \l "United States Constitution. Article VI, Clause II" \s "United States Constitution. Article VI, Clause II" \c 7 . It was held in NORTH LARAMIE LAND CO. v. HOFFMAN et al., 268 US 276, 283, 69 L. Ed. (1925) TA \l "NORTH LARAMIE LAND CO. v. HOFFMAN et al., 268 US 276, 283, 69 L. Ed. (1925)" \s "NORTH LARAMIE LAND CO. v. HOFFMAN et al., 268 US 276, 283, 69 L. Ed. (1925)" \c 1 TA \s "NORTH LARAMIE LAND CO. v. HOFFMAN et al." that: “All persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take note of the procedure adopted by them and when that procedure is ‘elsewhere’”. Thus the GOVERNMENT must be compelled to move pursuant to Rule 48(a) or (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure TA \l "Rule 48(a) or (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" \s "Rule 48(a) or (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" \c 3 , and DISMISS the flawed indictment in the interest of justice, and/or for the lack of legislative jurisdiction, and ORDER the DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE of the charges against Undersigned from FEDERAL AND STATE private contract, Immediately. Executed pursuant to TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1746(1), FEDERAL RULES of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 54 (c) TA \l "TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1746(1), FEDERAL RULES of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 54 (c)" \s "TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 1746(1), FEDERAL RULES of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 54 (c)" \c 3 , TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 4001 TA \l "TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 4001" \s "TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 4001" \c 3 : “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the UNITED STATES except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” (Section 4001) Whereas, the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, through its franchise and instrumentality, STATE OF CALIORNIA has never had jurisdiction over the Undersigned, the indictment must be DISMISSED ab initio. Whereas, Congress only has jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, the territories and insular possessions(ceded by the States) the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, through its franchise and instrumentality, STATE OF CALIFORNIA lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this cause. The Undersigned demands the immediate “release of the person” from its illegal, unlawful and un-Constitutional attachment and expungement of the private record. Whereas, the Sovereign, Republic of California state never gave the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, through its franchise and instrumentality, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, jurisdiction of the Private Sovereign Citizen with an Extradition Hearing (ceded by the State), the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, through its franchise and instrumentality, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, lacks Personal Jurisdiction in this cause, therefore this Court must dismiss the indictment, styled ____________. Whereas, there was no contrary intent that show that the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, through its franchise and instrumentality, STATE OF CALIFORNIA had jurisdiction, “all federal legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the UNITED STATES”, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, through its franchise and instrumentality, STATE OF CALIFORNIA lacks FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, over the above stated cause, and this Court must dismiss the above styled indictment. Quote: “The only stable state is the one in which all men are equal before the law”. Aristotle The Washington Post; Article entitled “The new Dixie Manifesto” By Michael Hill and Thomas Flemming, October 29, 1995, Section C, page 3 TA \l "The Washington Post; Article entitled \“The new Dixie Manifesto\” By Michael Hill and Thomas Flemming, October 29, 1995, Section C, page 3" \s "The Washington Post; Article entitled \"The new Dixie Manifesto\" By Michael Hill and Thomas Flemming, October 29, 1995, Section C, page 3" \c 3 TA \s "The Washington Post; Article entitled \"The new Dixie Manifesto\" By Michael Hill and Thomas Flemming, October 29, 1995, Section C, page 3" . Wherein it was stated: “What had been a genuinely federal union has been turned into a multiculturalm, continental empire, ruled from Washington (D.C.) by federal agencies and under the thumb of the federal judiciary. And all this is done regardless of the party of ideology that controlled the White House.” Quote: “Governments need armies to protect them from their enslaved and oppressed subjects”. Tolstoy Quote: “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” John F. Kennedy
The Undersigned prays(demands) for all other relief that this court deems fair and Just on the premises. Bkkjh Nlknkln Lhkjhkj The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that private conduct is beyond the reach of the government and that certain harmful, and therefore regulated activities require the actors to be “public officers” when it held the following.
“One great object of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private relations as they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law.
To implement these principles, courts must consider from time to time where the governmental sphere [e.g.“public purpose” and “public office”] ends and the private sphere begins. Although the conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances, governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional constraints. This is the jurisprudence of state action, which explores the "essential dichotomy" between the private sphere and the public sphere, with all its attendant constitutional obligations.” [. . .] Given that the statutory authorization for the challenges exercised in this case is clear, the remainder of our state action analysis centers around the second part of the Lugar test, whether a private litigant, in all fairness, must be deemed a government actor in the use of peremptory challenges. Although we have recognized that this aspect of the analysis is often a fact-bound inquiry, see [Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 939 TA \l "Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 939" \s "Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 939" \c 1 TA \s "Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 939" ],
our cases disclose certain principles of general application. Our precedents establish that, in determining whether a particular action or course of conduct is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine the following:
[1] the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, see Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) TA \l "see Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988)" \s "see Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988)" \c 1 TA \s "see Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope" ; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. TA \l "Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S." \s "Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S." \c 1 TA \s "Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority" 715 (1961);
[2] whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) TA \l "Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)" \s "Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)" \c 1 TA \s "Terry v. Adams" ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) TA \l "Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)" \s "Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)" \c 1 TA \s "Marsh v. Alabama" ; cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 -545 (1987) TA \l "San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 -545 (1987)" \s "San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 544 -545 (1987)" \c 1 TA \s "San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee" ;
[3] and whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) TA \l "Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)" \s "Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)" \c 1 TA \s "Shelley v. Kraemer" .
Based on our application of these three principles to the circumstances here, we hold that the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defendant in the District Court was pursuant to a course of state action. [Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991) TA \l "Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991)" \s "Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 500 U.S. 614 (1991)" \c 1 TA \s "Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company" ]
Note that the "statutory or decisional law" they are referring to above are ONLY. 1. Criminal law. 2. Franchises that are consensually engaged in using a private right to contract.
Again engagement in a private contract requires, good faith, honesty in FACT, full disclosure inclusive of a waiver of rights and arms length dealings. Failure to disclose, deception in fact, inducement to such contract and intentional malice and aforethought create fraud which vitiates all contracts(compacts) created there from.
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS John reserves the right to amend the court of records and all documents submitted as many times as justice so requires and to face and challenge any unknown accusers that may arise through the course of adjudication.
VERIFICATION I, John Arthur Nix, verify and declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States of America that I have prepared and reviewed the foregoing documents; and that contents are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Executed on this ____ Day of December, 2017 Reserving all inalienable rights without recourse.
Sui Juris: Of his own right; possessing full social and civil rights; not under any legal disability, or the power of another, or guardianship. Having capacity to manage one's own affairs; not under legal disability to act for one's self. See Emancipation; Majority. Sui Generis: Of its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its own kind; peculiar.
END OF MEMORANDUM